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Abstract
In many settings, decision-makers’ behavior is observed to vary based on
seemingly arbitrary factors. Such framing effects cast doubt on the welfare
conclusions drawn from revealed preference analysis. We relax the assumptions
underlying that approach to accommodate settings in which framing effects
are present. Plausible restrictions of varying strength permit either partial- or
point-identification of preferences for the decision-makers who choose consis-
tently across frames. Recovering population preferences requires understand-
ing the empirical relationship between decision-makers’ preferences and their
sensitivity to the frame. We develop tools for studying this relationship and
illustrate them with data on automatic enrollment into pension plans.
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Introduction
In many settings, people’s choices depend on seemingly arbitrary features of the
decision-making environment, such as which option is the default, the order in which
options are presented, or which features of the decision are salient. Such framing
effects cast doubt on the welfare conclusions that emerge from revealed preference
analysis. For example, suppose an internet company adopts an opt-out data collection
policy, under which it can use a customer’s data to target advertising, unless the
customer indicates otherwise. Prior research suggests that switching to an opt-in
policy, under which customers must give permission before the company can use
their data in this way, would reduce the number of customers who allow the company
to do so (Johnson, Bellman and Lohse, 2002). Suppose 40 percent of customers give
permission when the policy is opt-in and 65 percent do so when the policy is opt-out.
Both policies let customers control the use of their data, but the choices observed
under the two policies imply different conclusions about what customers prefer.
In this paper, we relax the assumptions underlying revealed preference analysis
to accommodate choice data contaminated by framing effects. We focus on binary
decisions in which the choices of some decision-makers vary according to a preference-
irrelevant feature of the environment, which we refer to as a frame (Salant and Ru-
binstein, 2008). Examples of frames might include: (1) which option is presented as
the default; (2) the order in which options are displayed; (3) the reference point from
which an option is evaluated; (4) whether the menu of options includes an irrelevant
alternative; (5) the point in time at which a decision is made; or (6) which features of
the available options are made salient. We assume that when decision-makers choose
consistently across frames, those choices reflect their preferences.1
Within this framework, we derive conditions for identifying preferences of various
groups of decision-makers. First, we show that when a frame pulls the choices of all
decision-makers in a uniform direction (frame monotonicity), one can identify the dis-
tribution of preferences for the consistent decision-makers – the subgroup unaffected
by the framing effect. This is true even when each decision-maker is observed making
only one decision and observers lack ex ante knowledge about which decision-makers
are consistent. Under frame monotonicity, a decision-maker who chooses “against
1By preferences, we mean the relative degree to which the available options further a decision-
maker’s objectives, whatever those may be. Preferences are not defined according to observed
choices; doing so would assume away the possibility of framing effects.
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the frame” – for example, someone who chooses the option that is not the default –
is consistent and prefers the option that she chooses. This fact, along with an ex-
ogeneity assumption concerning the assignment of decision-makers to frames, allows
us to point-identify the preferences of the consistent decision-makers. Without frame
monotonicity, the preferences of this group are partially identified, and we derive the
corresponding bounds.
Next, we turn to the problem of identifying preferences for the full population of
decision-makers. Our key insight is that this problem shares important features with
the classic selection-into-treatment problem from the program evaluation literature.
That is, once we have identified preferences for the subgroup of decision-makers who
are consistent, we can account for selection into that subgroup to recover preferences
for the overall population. Stated this way, the transformed problem is both more
familiar and more tractable than the original: economists have developed a range of
tools for dealing with endogeneity problems of this sort, and we adapt several to our
setting.
The first approach we develop is to extrapolate the preferences of the consistent
decision-makers to the inconsistent decision-makers by adjusting for observable dif-
ferences between the two groups. Recovering population preferences requires that
consistency and preferences be uncorrelated conditional on these observables. As
in other settings where researchers rely on matching or regression, the plausibility
of this assumption depends on the nature of selection and what information about
decision-makers the researcher can observe.
Second, we develop decision quality instruments, which exploit variation in decision-
makers’ susceptibility to a frame, but do not affect decision-makers’ preferences.
For example, decision-makers who are experimentally manipulated to have a higher
shadow value of leisure (e.g., by facing greater time pressure) may be more likely to
choose according to the frame, but such a manipulation is unlikely to affect which
option they actually prefer. Decision quality instruments identify the distribution
of preferences for those decision-makers whose susceptibility to the frame they af-
fect. We develop techniques to extrapolate the preferences of this subgroup to the
population.
Finally, we derive bounds on population preferences, based on the consistent
decision-makers. The usefulness of the bounds depend on the strength of the frame
– the bounds are tighter when when more decision-makers are consistent. One sur-
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prising finding from this analysis is that absent frame monotonicity, it may be that
a majority of the population prefers one option even though a majority selects the
other option under every frame that is observed.
A growing literature confronts the problem of preference identification in settings
with framing effects. One proposal is to restrict preference inferences to the subset
of observed choices in which a given decision-maker chooses consistently (Bernheim
and Rangel, 2009). In practice, however, individual decision-makers are typically
observed choosing under only one frame, which makes it difficult to detect which
choices are consistent. Worse, this approach yields no information on the inconsistent
decision-makers – the very group whose behavior is shaped by the choice of frame.
Further “refinements” can provide a path forward if the researcher can observe choices
in a frame in which all decision-makers are known to select their most-preferred
option (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015), but in many
applications, such as those in which behavior is sensitive to defaults or ordering effects,
there is little reason to believe that any of the observed frames satisfies this condition.
A different solution is to rely on a positive model of behavior that fully speci-
fies the mapping from decision-makers’ preferences to their (potentially sub-optimal)
behavior (Rubinstein and Salant, 2012). Inverting the model allows one to recover
preferences from the decision-makers’ observed choices. However, in many cases the
resulting welfare conclusions are sensitive to the researcher’s choice between compet-
ing positive models that are difficult to distinguish observationally. In some cases,
even a fully specified behavioral model is insufficient to recover preferences from choice
data (Benkert and Netzer, Forthcoming).
We contribute to this literature by developing a framework for preference identifi-
cation that strikes a middle ground between these approaches. Relative to Bernheim
and Rangel (2009), our approach requires additional structure, but the payoff to that
additional structure is significant: one can apply our results to the realistic class of
settings in which individual decision-makers are observed under only one frame and in
which the researcher is not confident that any one of the observed frames induces all
decision-makers to choose optimally. Relative to imposing a specific behavioral model,
an advantage of our framework is its generality: our central behavioral assumptions –
that consistent decision-makers choose optimally and frame monotonicity – hold un-
der a wide range of models for why framing effects occur. Consequently, our approach
can recover the preferences of the consistent decision-makers, as well as bounds on
3
population preferences, while remaining reasonably agnostic about the precise under-
lying model that generates the observed framing effect. In contrast, point-identifying
population preferences requires pinning down the relationship between preferences
and consistency, and implicitly, restricting the behavioral model that governs which
decision-makers are sensitive to the frame. We develop empirical tools to shed light
on this relationship under a range of assumptions about the available data and under-
lying behavioral model. Finally, our framework compliments model-based approaches
by making transparent the role the model’s assumptions play in identification: within
a broad class of models, distinguishing between behavioral or functional form assump-
tions matters only to the extent the assumptions offer conflicting predictions for the
relationship between preferences and consistency.2
We illustrate our framework using data on participation in an employer-sponsored
pension plan under two different default enrollment regimes. We show how the prefer-
ence information that can be recovered from the data depends on the strength of the
assumptions the researcher is willing to impose. Under relatively weak assumptions,
we find that a sizable majority of the consistent employees prefer enrollment. We
also document a strong positive relationship between employees’ sensitivity to fram-
ing effects (opt-in versus opt-out enrollment) and their preferences for enrollment in
the plan. We conclude that under plausible assumptions, the data imply a majority
of employees prefer participation in the pension plan, but that there is significant
heterogeneity. For example, employees that are likely to leave the firm within two
years disproportionately prefer not to participate.
Focusing on binary choices and binary frames permits us to view identification
through the lens of the potential outcomes framework commonly used in the program
evaluation literature (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996),3 but the intuition we develop
is useful outside of those settings as well, as we illustrate in an extension. We also
2We also contribute to a strand of literature that uses the preferences of a reference group of
decision-makers (whose choices are assumed to be optimal) as a guide to the rest of the population.
In previous work, the reference group consists of experts, identified based on information about
experience, occupation, or familiarity with the subject matter (Bronnenberg et al., 2015; Handel
and Kolstad, 2015; Johnson and Rehavi, 2016). Our contribution is to develop a method of applying
this approach to settings characterized by framing effects, in which no ex ante information is available
to identify members of the reference group. Rather, inclusion in the reference group (composed of
the consistent decision-makers) emerges endogenously from observable decision-making behavior.
3Unlike other applications of the potential outcomes framework of which we are aware, our goal
is not to identify the causal effects of one variable on another, but rather to remove variation in
observed choices due to framing effects, isolating the variation due to preferences.
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describe how the preference information identified by our approach can be combined
with price variation to estimate traditional measures of cardinal welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 presents our notation and main assump-
tions. Section 2 presents our results relating to the preferences of the consistent
decision-makers. Section 3 presents our results relating to the full population. Sec-
tion 4 illustrates our identification results using data on defaults and enrollment into
employer-provided pension plans. Section 5 describes how the preference information
we recover can be combined with price variation to derive conventional measures of
cardinal welfare. The Online Appendix contains: proofs of propositions; derivations
of standard errors; additional results relating to decision quality instrument extrap-
olation; supplementary material relating to the empirical application; and, gener-
alizations relating to non-binary frames, non-binary menus, and settings in which
decision-makers’ assignment to frames is non-random.
1 Formal Framework
Each decision-maker i is observed to choose from a fixed menu S = {0, 1} under
one of two possible frames Di ∈ {0, 1}.4 Let Yi(0) and Yi(1) denote what i would
choose under frames Di = 0 and Di = 1, respectively. Decision-makers have strict
ordinal preferences over the available options, with the most-preferred option denoted
by Y ∗i ∈ {0, 1}. Each decision-maker is characterized by a vector of random variables
(Yi(0), Yi(1), Di, Y ∗i ), drawn from some underlying population distribution. For each
i, the researcher observes the pair (Yi, Di), where Yi = Yi(1)Di + Yi(0)(1−Di). The
researcher does not observe Y ∗i , and observes only one of Yi(0) or Yi(1), depending
on the frame Di.
We denote mean choices among decision-makers assigned to each frame by Y (1) ≡
E[Yi|Di = 1] and Y (0) ≡ E[Yi|Di = 0]. Unless otherwise noted, the operator
E[.] denotes an expectation over the population distribution of the random variable
inside the square brackets (which may be a function of primitive random variables).
We assume for exposition that these population moments are directly observable to
the researcher, deferring issues of finite-sample statistical inference to the Online
Appendix. Without loss of generality, Y (1) ≥ Y (0). To illustrate the notation using
the privacy example from the introduction, let Yi indicate whether i allows a company
to use her data, Di = 1 indicate the opt-out regime, and Di = 0 indicate the opt-in
4Because the menu is constant across decision-makers, our notation conditions on it implicitly.
The Online Appendix considers generalizations to non-binary menus and non-binary frames.
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regime, so that Y (1) = 0.65 and Y (0) = 0.40.
Decision-makers either choose consistently or choose in a way that is sensitive to
the frame. We denote consistency by Ci = I {Yi(0) = Yi(0)}. Because each decision-
maker is observed under one frame, Ci is not observed. We assume that the fraction
of consistent decision-makers is strictly positive, E[Ci] > 0.
The following four assumptions form the core of our analysis.
A1 (Frame Separability) For all i, Y ∗i does not depend on D.
Frame separability is an assumption about the content of decision-makers’ preferences.
It is implicit in the above notation because we do not index Y ∗i by Di – otherwise,
individuals would have two random variables for Y ∗i (one for each frame). A1’s role is
to define which features of the decision-making environment are treated as a frame.5
Features of a decision that affect choice but that are relevant to decision-makers’
preferences over the available options are not frames. For example, if a decision-maker
chooses hot chocolate from {hot chocolate, ice cream} under D = 0 and ice cream
from {hot chocolate, ice cream} under D = 1, there would be no framing effect if D
indicates whether the season is winter or summer. Importantly, frame separability
does not require decision-makers to be irrational; a feature of the environment that
imposes a cognitive cost for selecting one of the options would constitute a frame,
as long as it did not also affect decision-makers’ preference for ending up with one
option or the other.6
The remaining assumptions concern the distribution of (Yi(0), Yi(1), Di, Y ∗i ) in
the population.
A2 (Frame Exogeneity) (Yi(0) , Yi(1), Y ∗i ) ⊥ Di.
Frame exogeneity is an assumption about the data-generating process by which
decision-makers are assigned to frames. The assumption ensures that differences in
observed choices under different frames are due to the effect of the frames, rather than
to differences in the decision-makers observed under each frame. Frame exogeneity is
guaranteed when decision-makers are randomly assigned to frames.7
We now turn to the link between choices and preferences. The standard re-
5This assumption is explicit in Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and implicit in Bernheim and Rangel
(2009), who require it for determining when two potentially conflicting choice situations differ in
terms of the frame or in terms of the available menu items. In this sense, frame separability is the
property that distinguishes variation in frames from variation in menu items.
6For a discussion of related issues, see Bernheim and Taubinsky (Forthcoming).
7The Online Appendix considers several generalizations in which frame exogeneity is relaxed.
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vealed preferences approach is to infer decision-makers’ preferences directly from their
choices:
RPA (Revealed Preferences Assumption) For all i, Y ∗i = Yi.
In our setting, a framing effect occurs when A1 and A2 are satisfied and one observes
Y (1) 6= Y (0). By definition, framing effects violate the RPA assumption. This is
because A2 implies Y (0) = E[Yi(0)] and Y (1) = E[Yi(1)], and E[Yi(0)] 6= E[Yi(1)]
implies Yi(1) 6= Yi(0) for some subset of decision-makers. But for any such decision-
maker, A1 and RPA imply Yi(1) = Y ∗i = Yi(0), yielding a contradiction. The next
assumption weakens RPA to accommodate choice data in which framing effects are
present:
A3 (Consistency Principle) For all i, Ci = 1 =⇒ Yi = Y ∗i .
Under the consistency principle, preferences are revealed by choices only for decision-
makers who choose consistently across frames. Because consistency is a function of
Yi(0) and Yi(1), the assumption constrains the joint distributions of Yi(0), Yi(1), and
Y ∗i . It is easy to see that the consistency principle weakens RPA by the minimum
necessary to accommodate an apparent framing effect. In the online privacy example
described above, the assumption implies that a customer who would choose to keep
her data private under both the opt-in and opt-out frames does in fact prefer that
her data be kept private. Like RPA, the assumption fails when decision-makers suffer
from biases that cause them to make the same mistake under every frame in which
they are observed.
The following monotonicity assumption permits us to recover aggregate informa-
tion about consistency even though Ci is not observable at the individual level.
A4 (Frame Monotonicity) For all i, Yi(1) ≥ Yi(0).
Frame monotonicity requires that when a frame affects choice, it does so in the same
direction for each affected decision-maker. It thus constrains the joint distribution
of Yi(0) and Yi(1). In the online privacy example, frame monotonicity fails if some
customers choose to allow access to their data if and only if doing so is not the
default. Much of our discussion will assume frame monotonicity, but we also derive
partial-identification results for settings in which it fails.
Examples of Framing Effects
The following are examples of behavioral models that might generate a particular
observed framing effect.
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Example 1: Default Effects Our running example will concern default effects.
The frame, D ∈ S, encodes which option is the default. Decision-makers choose
according to their (fixed) preferences ui(Y ) over a subset Γi ⊆ S of options that
they consider (as in Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay, 2012). Decision-makers can
be either active or passive. When active, decision-makers consider both options,
Γi(D) = S. When passive, they consider only the option that is the default, Γi(D) =
D. Because ui does not depend on the default, frame separability is satisfied. To
see that the consistency principle holds, suppose some individual i chooses the same
option under both defaults, Yi(0) = Yi(1) = 1. Because i chooses 1 under D = 0, we
know that 1 ∈ Γ(0), and therefore that i is active under D = 0, with ui(1) > ui(0). To
see that frame monotonicity holds, suppose Yi(0) = 1 (when Yi(0) = 0, the condition
holds trivially). As above, Yi(0) = 1 implies i is active under D = 0 and prefers
option 1. Because 1 ∈ Γi(1) as well, we know that Yi(1) = 1. Hence, Yi(1) ≥ Yi(0).
Example 2: Time Inconsistency At date t, decision-makers choose between
receiving some amount y0 at date t+k or some other amount y1 > y0 at date t+k+1.
As in Laibson (1997), individuals choose according to the following behavioral utility




iu(zt+k), where zt is total income at time t, βi ≤ 1,
and δti < 1 ∀t. The frame denotes whether k = 0 (D = 0) or k > 0 (D = 1).
Assuming the amounts in y0 and y1 are small relative to background income, it is
straightforward to show that when D = 0, i chooses y1 iff y0y1 < βiδi, and that when
D = 1, i chooses y1 iff y0y1 < δi. Welfare may be evaluated either according to βiδ
t
i
(the short-term view) or δti (the long term view) (Bernheim, 2009). In either case,
it is straightforward to verify that the consistency principle holds and that frame
monotonicity holds as long as βi ≤ 1 for all i. In addition, frame separability holds
as long as the welfare-relevant discount rate does not vary within an individual based
on the time the decision is made (as it would under ũit).
Example 3: Bias Unrelated to Observed Framing Effect Consider a setting
in which both default effects and present-bias are present. As above, decision-makers
choose between y0 at date t + k and y1 > y0 at date t + k + 1, but now either y0 or





Example 1.2, some decision-makers are passive, and choose whichever option is set
as the default. The other decision-makers are active (but present-biased), and choose




iu(zt+k). Choices are observed only at k = 0,
with decision-makers randomly assigned across defaults. The consistency principle
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fails here because the decision-makers who are consistent with respect to the default
are present-biased: an active decision-maker chooses y1 if y0y1 < βiδi but prefers y1 if
y0
y1
< δi. Hence, some of those who consistently select y0 would actually prefer y1.
This example highlights that our framework can recover preferences only when any
mistakes are due to an observed framing effect. In settings where a bias is present,
but no inconsistency is observed, our approach (like traditional revealed preference
analysis) would incorrectly infer preferences from choices. If choices were observed
under each frame and also under both k = 0 and k > 0, one could apply our approach
to first eliminate the framing effect at each value of k and second to use those results
to estimate the behavioral parameters β and δ.
2 Identifying Consistent Preferences
We initially focus on the consistent decision-makers – i.e., those whose behavior is
not affected by the frame. Recovering the preferences of this group would be trivial if
decision-makers were observed under both frames; in that case an observer could iden-
tify which decision-makers were consistent and, using the consistency principle, which
options the consistent decision-makers preferred. However, many real-world datasets
do not have this property, and even when they do the order in which decision-makers
are exposed to frames may itself affect behavior (LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2003). The
following proposition provides conditions for the identification of consistent decision-
makers’ preferences when each decision-maker is observed under a single frame.
Proposition 1 Let Y C ≡ Y (0)Y (0)+1−Y (1) .
(1.1) Under A1 - A4, E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] = Y C.
(1.2) Under A1 - A3, Y C ≥ 12 =⇒ Y C ≤ E[Y
∗
i |Ci = 1] ≤ 1, and Y C ≤ 12 =⇒ 0 ≤
E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] ≤ Y C . These bounds are sharp under the stated assumptions.
Proposition 1.1 follows from the insight that, under frame monotonicity, only con-
sistent decision-makers choose against the frame (i.e., they choose Yi(0) = 1 or
Yi(1) = 0). Frame exogeneity guarantees that the assignment of individuals to frames
is uncorrelated with preferences or consistency, which means that we can treat the set
of decision-makers choosing against the frame as a representative sample of all con-
sistent choosers. In turn, the consistency principle ensures that the observed choices
of this group reveal the preferences of the corresponding decision-makers. As a result,
the denominator of Y C measures the fraction of decision-makers who are consistent
and the numerator measures the subset of that group with Y ∗i = 1. A proof of
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Table 1: Illustration of Proposition 1
























Under frame monotonicity, top-right quadrant = 0; top-left quadrant
= 1− Y (1); bottom-right quadrant = Y (0); bottom-left quadrant
= Y (1)− Y (0).
Fraction consistent: E[Ci] = 0.4 + 0.35= 0.75
Fraction of consistent
preferring option 1:
E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] = Y C = 0.40.4+0.35≈ 0.53
Bounds on consistent
preferences, without A4:
0.53 ≤ E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] ≤ 1
Y C is biased toward 12 , as frame defiers are equally
assigned to the top-left and bottom-right quadrants by
frame exogeneity (by definition they cannot be in the
bottom-left quadrant).
Proposition 1.1, and of further results, is contained in the Online Appendix.
Proposition 1.2 provides a partial identification result that is robust to failures of
frame monotonicity. Borrowing terminology from Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996),
define frame-defiers as the subset of inconsistent decision-makers who select Yi(0) = 1
and Yi(1) = 0. Frame-defiers would be misclassified as consistent by the logic un-
derlying Proposition 1.1. To understand the intuition behind the proof, note that
decision-makers choosing against the frame under either frame may be either consis-
tent choosers or frame-defiers. Because frame-defiers are assigned to the two different
frames in equal proportions (by frame exogeneity), Proposition 1.1 will classify half
of the frame-defiers as choosing Yi = 1 consistently and half as choosing Yi = 0
consistently. Ignoring the presence of frame-defiers therefore biases Y C toward 12 .
The reasoning behind Proposition 1 is further illustrated in Table 1, which ap-
plies the result to the online privacy example from the Introduction. The preference
information recovered by Proposition 1 is important for several reasons. First, if
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one’s philosophical starting point is that inconsistent decision-makers lack norma-
tively relevant preferences (see Fischhoff, 1991), Proposition 1 is the end-point of the
analysis; it isolates the normatively relevant parameter from the noise induced by
the frames.8 Second, when population preferences are known – what Bernheim and
Rangel (2009) refer to as a “refinement” – Proposition 1 can be used in conjunction
with that information to recover the preferences of the inconsistent decision-makers.9
The preferences of this group can be an input into welfare calculations (see Section
5), but are not directly revealed under a refinement. Finally, the preferences of the
consistent decision-makers may be used to recover the preferences of the remainder of
the population by accounting for selection into the consistent sub-population, which
is our focus in the next section.
3 Identifying Population Preferences
This section develops several methods for using the preferences of the consistent
decision-makers to shed light on the rest of the population. To frame the problem,
one can use the law of iterated expectations to write:
E[Y ∗i ] = E[Ci]E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] + (1− E[Ci]) E[Y ∗i |Ci = 0] (1)
From Proposition 1.1, E[Ci] and E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] are identified under A1-A4, but
E[Y ∗i |Ci = 0] is entirely unrestricted. Consequently, the formal challenge in recov-
ering E[Y ∗i ] is the same as the standard sample selection problem that arises in the
program evaluation literature (Manski, 1989).10 Specifically, when selection into the
consistent sub-population is non-random, the preferences of that group can yield a
biased estimate for the preferences of the population:11
E[Y ∗i ] = E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1]−
1
E[Ci]
cov (Y ∗i , Ci) (2)
8For example, suppose the fraction of voters supporting a referendum varies based on the question
wording. It is straightforward to show that randomizing the wording evenly across two options biases
the average vote share toward 0.5, which can affect the outcome if the referendum requires a super-
majority to pass. In cases like this, isolating the average choices of the consistent voters may be the
best option.







10One important difference is that in the typical sample selection context, the researcher can
identify which units have been selected into the sample and which have not. In contrast, consistency
is unobservable in our setup.
11Equation (2) follows from the definitions of covariance and conditional expectation.
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However, when susceptibility to the frame is uncorrelated with preferences – a condi-
tion we refer to as consistency independence – Equation (2) highlights that E[Y ∗i ] =
E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1]. In that case, Proposition 1 permits identification of population prefer-
ences without further adjustments. More generally, Equation (2) shows that under A1
- A4, recovering the covariance between preferences and consistency is equivalent to
identifying the ordinal preferences of the population; the particulars of the behavioral
model only matter to the extent they shape this relationship.
The nature of the selection in (1) and (2) depends on the model determining which
agents are consistent. To illustrate, consider the following two potential models for
default effects, both of which are nested by the default effects example in Section 1.
Decision-Making Types Model of Default Effects Suppose that sensitivity
to the default is an innate characteristic or influenced by factors such as education
or prior experience that are exogenous to the specific choice being considered (as
in Chetty et al., 2014). The distribution of active types depends on the following
statistical model: Ci = 1 ⇐⇒ C̃i ≥ 0, C̃i = βCθCi + ηCi , where θCi denotes the
vector of individual characteristics that determine whether one is active, and ηci de-
notes idiosyncratic variation across individuals. Similarly, Y ∗i = 1 ⇐⇒ Ỹi ≥ 0,
Ỹi = βY θYi + ηYi , where θYi denotes the vector of characteristics that determine or-
dinal preference and ηYi denotes idiosyncratic variation.12 Assume ηCi and ηYi are
independent of the other random variables in the model and of one another. We then
have cov(Y ∗i , Ci) = p(Ỹi > 0; C̃i > 0) − p(Ỹi > 0)p(C̃i > 0). Consistency indepen-
dence fails if θCi and θYi contain common characteristics, or characteristics that are
correlated in the population of decision-makers.
Bounded Rationality Model of Default Effects Suppose instead that variation
in consistency is driven in part by the utility stakes of the choice at hand. Decision-
makers must incur a cognitive cost, γi ≥ 0, to choose actively and consider an option
that is not the default. Decision-makers first choose whether to be active or pas-
sive, and then choose from the options they consider. We assume decision-makers
know which option is the default at the time they make both of these decisions.
Let ∆ui = ui(1) − ui(0), and let F∆(.) denote its cumulative distribution over the
population of decision-makers. Here, consistency will be determined by the net ben-
efit to i of choosing her most-preferred option when that option is not the default,
C̃i = |∆ui| − γi, and we let FC̃(.) describe its cumulative distribution. Decision-
12Note that some of the characteristics contained in θYi and θCi are potentially unobservable.
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makers are active iff C̃i > 0, so the fraction of consistent decision-makers in the
population is given by E[Ci] = 1−FC̃(0). Similarly, the fraction with Y ∗i = 1 is given
by E[Y ∗i ] = 1 − F∆(0). One can then derive the relationship between preferences












C̃|∆u>0(0). This would obtain, for instance, when the foregone utility from
following the default when the default is not optimal is symmetric across agents with
opposite ordinal preferences. Intuitively, the identification challenge in this model
is that consistency depends on the “stakes” of the decision, and empirically, the
stakes may differ among decision-makers with different ordinal preferences. When
this source of variation is unimportant relative to decision-maker characteristics in
explaining consistency, as would be the case when the variance of |∆ui| is negligi-
ble relative to the variance in γi, this model approximates the decision-making types
model described above (see also Appendix Figure 3).
Note that in this example we assume the decision-maker knows ∆ui with certainty
(see also Conlisk, 1996). One could alternatively suppose that the individual decides
whether to choose actively based on whether the expected net benefit of doing so
exceeds the cost. As it is nested by the general model of default effects presented in
Example 1 of Section 1, such a model would not violate our core assumptions. The
model imposes a similar set of challenges for extrapolation to population preferences
as the model with certainty. We discuss additional nuance introduced by this type of
model in Online Appendix A.
These examples illustrate that consistency independence is likely to fail in many
applications. The remainder of this section proposes a range of empirical methods
for shedding light on the relationship between preferences and consistency.
3.1 Partial Identification
The following result clarifies the limits of what can be learned about population
preferences without the imposition of additional behavioral assumptions.
Proposition 2
(2.1) Under A1-A4, E[Y ∗i ] ∈
[
Y (0), Y (1)
]
.
(2.2) Under A1 -A3, max
{
Y (0)− (1− Y (1)) , 0
}
≤ E[Y ∗] ≤ min
{
Y (0) + Y (1) , 1
}
.
13The derivation follows from the definition of covariance, cov(Y ∗i , Ci) = E[Y ∗i Ci] − E[Y ∗i ]E[Ci],
the expressions for E[Y ∗i ] and E[Ci], and the fact that E[Y ∗i Ci] = E[Y ∗i ]E[Ci|Y ∗i = 1] = E[Y ∗i ](1−
FB(0)|Y ∗i = 1).
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In addition, the bounds in (2.1) and (2.2) are sharp under the stated assumptions.
The result in (2.1) follows directly from the equivalence of the standard sample
selection problem and our setting, once the assumptions required for Proposition 1
are assumed (Manski, 1989). Intuitively, the fraction of the population that prefers
an option lies between the fraction choosing that option under each of the two frames.
As a result, the bounds will be relatively informative when the fraction of inconsistent
decision-makers is small.
Without frame monotonicity, we obtain weaker, one-directional bounds for popu-
lation preferences. The result in (2.2) follows from substituting the partial identifica-
tion results in Proposition (1.2) into Equation (1). In particular, E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] and
E[Ci] can be identified given information on the prevalence of frame-defiers. Know-
ing that E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] ∈ [0, 1] constrains the prevalence of frame-defiers, which then
yields bounds on the value of E[Y ∗i ]. The further Y (0) is from 1 − Y (1), the more
informative the bounds will be.14 Notably, when frame monotonicity fails, (2.2) shows
it is possible that a majority of decision-makers choose one option under both frames
even though the other option is preferred by a majority of all decision-makers.
3.2 Adjusting for Observable Correlates of Consistency
A classic approach to overcoming selection problems is to condition on observables.
Such an approach is useful here when the correlation between preferences and con-
sistency is driven by characteristics of decision-makers that are observable to the
researcher.
Formally, suppose that decision-makers exhibit a vector of observable characteris-
tics, denoted by random variable Xi ∈ X. Define Y (D,X) = E[Yi(D)|Di = D,Xi =
X] to be the cell-specific analogs to the population means defined above. Define
q(X) as the ratio of consistent decision-makers with Xi = X relative to all consistent
decision-makers, q(X) = Y (0,X)+1−Y (1,X)
EXi [Y (0,Xi)+1−Y (1,Xi)]
, where EXi [.] is the expectation over
the random variable Xi.We define s(X) as the corresponding ratio for the inconsis-
tent decision-makers, s(X) = Y (1,X)−Y (0,X)
EXi [Y (1,Xi)−Y (0,Xi)]
. Last, we assume frame exogeneity
holds conditional on each value of X:
A2’ (Conditional Frame Exogeneity). For all X ∈ X, (Yi(1), Yi(0)) ⊥ Di |Xi = X.
The identification strategy we propose in such settings is to: first, estimate the prefer-
14When Y (0) = 1−Y (1), the bounds are entirely uninformative because the data do not constrain
the fraction of frame-defiers and, as a result, we cannot rule out E[Ci] = 0. Consequently, when
Y (0) = 1− Y (1), any E[Y ∗i ] ∈ [0, 1] is feasible without frame monotonicity.
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ences of consistent decision-makers with a given set of observable characteristics; sec-
ond, extrapolate preferences from consistent to inconsistent decision-makers with the
same observable characteristics; and third, aggregate preferences across cells based on
the estimated distribution of characteristics in the full population or sub-population
of inconsistent decision-makers. A barrier to employing this familiar approach in our
context is that we cannot directly observe consistency. The following lemma, analo-
gous to Abadie (2003), provides conditions under which the aggregate distribution of
characteristics among the consistent and inconsistent decision-makers can nonetheless
be identified.
Lemma 1 Under A1, A2’, A3, and A4:
(L1.1) For any X, p(Xi = X|Ci = 1) = q(X) p(Xi = X)
(L1.2) For any X, p(Xi = X|Ci = 0) = s(X) p(Xi = X).
The next step in the identification strategy proceeds using the following assumption:
A5 (Conditional Consistency Independence) For all individuals i and all observable
characteristics X ∈ X, cov(Y ∗i , Ci |Xi = X) = 0.
Conditional consistency independence requires that consistent and inconsistent decision-
makers with the same observable characteristics have the same distribution of pref-
erences. The assumption is analogous to one commonly employed in the program
evaluation literature, i.e., that observationally equivalent individuals do not sort on
the unobserved gain to treatment (e.g., Angrist and Fernandez-Val, 2013). It is also
similar to the type of assumption that has been relied on in the line of papers de-
scribed in the introduction (e.g., Bronnenberg et al., 2015), in which the preferences
of a reference group of experts is extrapolated to the population.
Exploiting Lemma 1 along with conditional consistency independence, the fol-
lowing proposition formalizes the matching-on-observables identification strategy de-
scribed above:
Proposition 3 Let Y C(X) = Ȳ (0,X)Ȳ (0,X)+1−Ȳ (1,X) . Under Assumptions A1, A2’, A3,
A4, and A5 :









As with any matching-on-observables approach, the plausibility of this approach will
15Replacing assumption A2 with A2’ in (1.1) implies that E[Ci] = EXi [Ȳ (0, Xi) + 1− Ȳ (1, Xi)],
and E[Y ∗|Ci = 1] = EXi [q(Xi)Y C(Xi)]. Even when A2 is satisfied, this revised estimator for E[Ci] is
preferable for applying Proposition 3 in finite samples, due to possible spurious correlation between
the observables and the frame.
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depend on the detail and nature of the observable characteristics as well as the un-
derlying positive model of behavior, as demonstrated by the following two examples.
Decision-Making Types Model of Default Effects As before, suppose that
preferences and consistency in the population are (respectively) characterized by la-
tent index models Ỹi = βY θYi + ηYi and C̃i = βCθCi + ηCi , but unlike before, we now
interpret θYi and θCi to denote the vector of observable characteristics. Accordingly, ηYi
and ηCi denote the unobservable determinants of preferences and consistency. Condi-
tional consistency independence requires that ηYi and ηCi are independent, conditional
on θYi and θCi . For example, it could be that highly educated customers are less likely
to prefer that companies use their personal data and are more likely to choose con-
sistently across default regimes; but that conditional on education, preferences and
consistency are uncorrelated.
Bounded Rationality Model of Default Effects Let F
C̃|X(·) denote the cumu-
lative density of C̃i after conditioning on Xi = X. It is straightforward to show
that conditional consistency independence requires F
C̃|X(0) = FC̃|X,∆u>0(0) for each
X. This holds if the observed characteristics absorb enough variation in |∆ui| and
γi such that the remaining, unobserved variation in consistency is uncorrelated with
ordinal preferences. For example, suppose the set of observables is rich enough to
absorb variation in consistency associated with the utility stakes of the decision,
Xi = Xj =⇒ |∆ui| = |∆uj| for any two individuals i and j. Conditional consistency
independence would then hold if the remaining variation in opt-out costs is uncor-
related with the remaining variation in ordinal preferences, a sufficient condition for
which is that the structural parameters of the model are (conditionally) indepen-
dently distributed, (γi ⊥ ∆ui) |Xi = X. In contrast, when the (conditional) variation
in consistency is driven by selection on the gains to choosing actively, both consis-
tency and ordinal preferences are driven by the same underlying structural parameter
(∆ui); hence one would not expect their distributions to be independent, except in
special cases.16.
3.3 Decision Quality Instruments
When conditioning on observables does not yield a credible identification strategy,
researchers sometimes turn to instrumental variables designs. To develop the analog
to that strategy here, we introduce the notion of a decision quality instrument, a com-
16A similar challenge arises in the program evaluation context, when individuals select into treat-
ment based on the gains from doing so, as in the Roy model.
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ponent of the decision-making environment that affects decision-makers’ consistency
but that is unrelated to their preferences.17
Formally, the decision quality instrument is a a new random variable, Zi ∈ {0, 1}.
Choices can depend on both the frame and the instrument, Yi(D,Z), so there are
now four potential outcomes. Each decision-maker chooses once under a single (D,Z)
combination. For each i, we observe (Yi, Di, Zi), where Yi = Yi(Di, Zi). Consistency
is defined at each value of the instrument, Ci(Z) = I {Yi(0, Z) = Yi(1, Z)}. We denote
the fraction of decision-makers choosing Yi = 1 under a given (D,Z) combination by
Y (D,Z) ≡ E [Yi(Di, Zi) |Di = D, Zi = Z].
The following assumptions establish the type of variation that constitutes a valid
decision quality instrument:
A2” (Exogeneity of D and Z) (Yi(0, 0), Yi(1, 0), Yi(1, 0), Yi(1, 1)) ⊥ (Di, Zi)
A6 (Decision Quality Monotonicity) For all i, Ci(1) ≥ Ci(0) and E[Ci(1)−Ci(0)] > 0.
A7 (Decision Quality Exclusion Restriction) For all i, Y ∗i does not depend on Z.
Assumption A2” modifies frame exogeneity, which now requires both Di and Zi to
be uncorrelated with confounding factors. A6 requires the effect of Z on consistency
to be weakly monotonic for all decision-makers and strictly monotonic for some. A7
requires that variation in the decision-making environment induced by Z be irrelevant
from the perspective of decision-makers’ preferences; it ensures that Z affects behavior
by altering consistency, not by changing which option decision-makers prefer.18 Like
frame separability, A7 does not rule out variation in Z affecting welfare by altering
the real costs of choosing against the frame. Although generally untestable with the
type of data we assume, A7 may be tested if one observes variation in Z affecting
choices in a setting without framing effects (in which case the variation in Z should
not affect behavior).
Variation in Z might arise from natural experiments or be induced by researchers.
For example, suppose that some decision-makers were randomly assigned to a treat-
ment group aimed at manipulating their “cognitive load” – such as by memorizing
17A standard instrumental variable might be used to identify the effect of a treatment on choice,
say E [Yi(1)− Yi(0)], when assignment to frames is confounded with individuals’ potential outcomes.
In contrast, we propose to use exogenous variation in whether an individual is consistent. In other
words, we are “instrumenting” for C, not for D (which would be standard). To map our prior results
into this notation, one can interpret Yi(D) in previous sections as Yi(D,Z) for some fixed value of
Z.
18Like frame separability, A7 is an assumption about whether Y ∗i must be indexed by Z, rather
than a distributional assumption.
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a 10-digit number – prior to making the decision being studied. Such experimental
designs could plausibly manipulate decision-makers’ susceptibility to a frame (e.g.,
Pocheptsova et al., 2009) in ways that are unrelated to their preferences. Other ex-
amples of decision quality instruments might include the time pressure for making a
decision, the cost of obtaining or processing information about the available choices,
the opportunity cost of cognitive resources at the time of decision-making, the in-
tensity of the frame (e.g., the degree to which one alternative is more salient than
another), or the complexity of the choice presented (as in Brown et al., 2017).
Proposition 4 Assume that A1, A3, and A4 hold at each fixed value of Z, and
assume A2”, A6, and A7. Then
E [Y ∗i |Ci(1) > Ci(0)] =
Y (0, 1)− Y (0, 0)
Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)−
(
Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 1)
) .
Proposition 4 is best understood by analogy to the identification of a local average
treatment effect (LATE, see Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The monotonicity assump-
tion (A7) permits us to divide the population into three groups: the always-consistent
(Ci(1) = Ci(0) = 1), the consistency-compliers Ci ((1) = 1; Ci(0) = 0), and the never-
consistent (Ci(1) = Ci(0) = 0). The denominator of the expression in Proposition 4
measures the reduction in the size of the inconsistent sub-group as we move from
Z = 0 to Z = 1, which identifies the size of the consistency-compliers group (the ana-
log of the compliers in the standard LATE framework). The expression in the numer-
ator measures the change in the fraction choosing Y = 1 under D = 0 as Z changes,
which identifies the fraction of decision-makers who are consistency-compliers and
prefer Y ∗i = 1. Dividing the latter by the former yields the fraction of the consistency-
compliers with Y ∗i = 1. Table 2 further illustrates the intuition behind the Proposition
by applying it to hypothetical data from the online privacy example first described in
the Introduction. The table highlights that Proposition 4 works by essentially apply-
ing Proposition 1.1 separately by values Z, and then identifying E [Y ∗i |Ci(1) > Ci(0)]
by comparing E [Y ∗i |Ci(0) = 1] to E [Y ∗i |Ci(1) = 1]. Unlike conventional instrumen-
tal variable analyses, the variable affected by a decision quality instrument (con-
sistency) is not directly observable to the researcher. Consequently, Proposition 4
requires frame monotonicity in addition to the standard IV monotonicity assumption
(A6) in (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In addition, Proposition 4 may be extended
beyond binary instruments by applying the result to each pair-wise combination of Z
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Table 2: Illustration of Proposition 4
When Z = 0 When Z = 1
Yi(0, 0) = 0 Yi(0, 0) = 1 Yi(0, 1) = 0 Yi(0, 1) = 1
-



































Fraction consistent: E[Ci(0)] = 0.40 + 0.35= 0.75 Fraction consistent: E[Ci(1)] = 0.50 + 0.45= 0.95
Fraction consistent
and prefer option 1: E [Ci(0)Y
∗
i ] = 0.40
Fraction consistent
and prefer option 1: E [Ci(1)Y
∗









i |Ci(1) = 1] = 0.450.5+0.45 =
0.47
Fraction consistency-complier: E[Ci(1)]− E[Ci(0)] = 0.95− 0.75 = 0.20
Fraction consistency-complier and prefer option 1: E [(Ci(1)− Ci(0))Y ∗i ] = 0.45− 0.40 = 0.05
Consistency-complier preferences: E[Y ∗i |Ci(1) > Ci(0)] = 0.050.20 = 0.25
values. Such variation allows the researcher to non-parameterically trace out the rela-
tionship between consistency and preferences, similar to identification of the marginal
treatment effect in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007).
As with a standard instrument, the quantity identified by Proposition 4 corre-
sponds to a specific sub-group of the population – in our setting, it is those whose
sensitivity to the frame varies by Z. This quantity can be of interest for several rea-
sons. First, consider a government deciding which value of Z to implement, for exam-
ple a regulator deciding how streamlined privacy controls should be. The solution to
this problem trades off the cost of selecting a value of Z that induces greater consis-
tency against the welfare gain from doing so. The latter depends on the preferences of
the decision-makers who choose consistently at one candidate Z but not in another,
which Proposition 4 can be used to estimate. Second, Proposition 4 can shed light
on the underlying behavioral model. For a decision-quality instrument that affects
present bias, for example, the “long-run” view of welfare in the quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting model described Section 1 predicts all of the consistency-compliers will prefer
to consume the larger amount at the later date. Estimating E[Y ∗i |Ci(1) > Ci(0)] can
test this hypothesis. Finally, the relationship between the preferences identified by
Proposition 4 and the preferences identified by Proposition 1 can be extrapolated to
shed light on the relationship between preferences and consistency for the full popula-
tion.19 Because this extrapolation problem depends on the positive model generating
19An interesting special case occurs when all decision-makers are consistent under Z = 1,
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the framing effects, we shall discuss it in the context of our running examples.
Decision-Making Types Model of Default Effects In this model, a decision
quality instrument exploits variation that induces a passive type to become ac-
tive, or vice-versa – e.g., being warned about the bias before making the deci-
sion. Incorporating the decision quality instrument into the statistical model yields
C̃i = βCθCi + δCi Zi + ηCi and Ỹi = βY θYi + δYi Zi + ηYi , where we now allow ηCi and
ηYi to have arbitrary correlation with one another to reflect unobserved determinants
of consistency and preferences. Note that A6 corresponds to δYi = 0 ∀i and A7 cor-
responds to δCi ≥ 0 ∀i and δCi > 0 for some i. Proposition 4 sheds light on the
relationship between ηCi and ηYi , which, depending on the functional form of their
joint distribution, can be used to recover the distribution of population preferences
in the spirit of Heckman (1979) (see Online Appendix Section C.1). Again, richer
variation in Z would allow one to identify the joint distribution of ηci and η
y
i more
flexibly; we describe one such approach in Online Appendix Section C.2.
Bounded Rationality Model of Default Effects In the bounded rationality
model, a natural source for decision quality instruments is variation in the distribution
of costs associated with choosing actively, γi. For example, such variation might make
it easier or more difficult to select the non-default option, perhaps by simplifying
the opt-out process (expanding or reducing the number of forms to fill out or the
amount of red tape). Suppose that γi = γ0i − δZi, where Zi is the binary decision
quality instrument and δ > 0. In this case, the consistency-compliers are those with
−δ < |∆ui| − γ0i < 0. Reducing γ induces this group to start choosing actively.
Variation in Z thus provides information on the distribution of ∆ui, F∆. With a
binary instrument, identifying E[Y ∗i ] requires imposing a functional form for F∆.
With more variation in Z, F∆ can be estimated more flexibly. We provide additional
detail in Online Appendix Section C.3.
4 Application to Automatic 401(k) Enrollment
In this section we illustrate our framework with data on enrollment decisions into
employer-provided 401(k) pension plans. Such plans can either be opt-in, so that
new employees must actively enroll in the plan to participate, or opt-out, so that
i.e., E[Ci(1)] = 1. In this case, E[Y ∗i |Ci(1) = 1] = E[Y ∗], so choices under Z = 1 are a
“refinement” in which the preferences of the full population are identified. Under this condi-
tion, the estimand in Proposition 4 is the preferences of the inconsistent choosers at Z = 0,
E[Y ∗i |Ci(1) > Ci(0)] = E[Y ∗i |Ci(0) = 0]. Consequently, one can recover the preferences of the
population and of the inconsistent decision-makers without further extrapolation.
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new employees are enrolled by default. A large body of research documents strik-
ing differences in enrollment and savings behavior between opt-in and opt-out plan
designs (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2006; Chetty et al., 2014). Unless em-
ployee saving preferences depend on whether enrollment is the default, such findings
undermine the use of traditional revealed preference analysis in this setting. In con-
trast, our approach accounts for the observed framing effect to shed light on employee
preferences.
4.1 Data
Our data come from the large health care and insurance firm studied in Madrian and
Shea (2001). The firm switched from an opt-in to an opt-out enrollment policy in
April 1998. Under the opt-out policy, passive employees were automatically enrolled
at a default contribution rate of 3 percent of salary. Under both designs, the employer
provided a 50% match on employee contributions of up to 6 percent, and employee
contributions into the plan were capped at 15 percent.
We observe whether employee i enrolls in the plan (indicated by Yi) and whether
the default is opt-in (Di = 0) or opt-out (Di = 1) at the date of hire. We also observe
annual compensation, age, sex, and race for each employee.20 The income, age, and
racial composition of the firm’s employees are typical of a large employer in the US,
although the firm’s workforce is disproportionately female. Employer contributions
vest in the pension after two years of employment. We refer readers to Madrian and
Shea (2001) for additional details regarding the data and the change in plan design.
As expected, participation is greater under opt-out than under opt-in, y0 = 0.491
and y1 = 0.859 (we use lower-case letters to denote estimated sample analogs to the
population moments described in earlier sections).
4.2 Recovery of Consistent Preferences
Under A1-A4, Proposition 1 allows us to identify the preferences of the consistent
employees. Frame separability (A1) requires that preferences over plan participation
do not depend on whether the design is opt-in or opt-out. This seems likely to hold,
as it is difficult to imagine an employee’s preferences over how much to save depend
on how her employer chooses to structure enrollment into its sponsored retirement
plan.21 Absent A1, the behavior observed by Madrian and Shea would not constitute
20For confidentiality purposes, we received binned data on compensation and age.
21Enrollment preferences could depend on the default if employees are uncertain over whether
they should enroll in the plan and interpret the default as advice from their employer. However,
21
a framing effect and standard revealed preference analysis would suffice to recover
employee preferences.
Frame exogeneity (A2) requires that an employee’s hire date (within the window
studied) be uncorrelated with whether she chooses to participate under either plan
design. This is the same assumption required to identify the causal effect of the change
in plan design on participation; Madrian and Shea present suggestive evidence that
it holds by showing the observable characteristics of employees hired before and after
the change in plan design are similar. Appendix Table 1 replicates that analysis for
the modified sample we study; our results are quite similar to theirs.
The consistency principle (A3) requires that employees who choose to participate
in the plan under both the opt-out and opt-in design actually prefer participation,
and similarly, that employees who choose non-participation under both designs prefer
not to participate. In contrast, the standard revealed preference assumption requires
that all employees – even those whose choices depend on the participation default
– prefer the option that they choose. The consistency principle will be violated if
employees’ choices are characterized by biases that manifest themselves across both
frames; for example, if employees who consistently choose not to enroll only make
that decision because of present-bias.22 If employee participation decisions are biased
for reasons unrelated to automatic enrollment (the observed framing effect), further
deviations from revealed preference analysis beyond the consistency principle would
be needed to accurately recover preferences.
Finally, frame monotonicity (A4) requires that no employee chooses to enroll when
enrollment is opt-in, but chooses not to enroll when enrollment is opt-out. Frame
monotonicity is not directly testable without observing employees making repeated
choices across multiple frames, but it can be falsified if we observe a reduction in par-
employees in the firm we study who were not automatically enrolled did not shift their 401(k)
contributions to the default contribution rate that applied to automatically enrolled employees, as
would be expected if they acted on the default as advice (Carroll et al., 2009). Particularly in the
401(k) context, default effects being driven primarily by trust in one’s employer would be surprising
given the countervailing incentives that arise when pension plans have an employer match (Bubb
and Warren, 2017).
22Not all forms of present-bias would cause the consistency principle to fail. In the models of
default-sensitivity studied by Carroll et al. (2009) and Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov (2015), for
example, present-bias causes individuals to procrastinate and stick with the default until they make
an active choice, at which time the amount they choose to save will be optimal. Such behavior
satisfies the consistency principle because those individuals who choose consistently have selected
their most-preferred option.
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ticipation rates under opt-out enrollment for any subgroup of employees. Appendix
Figure 2 plots employee participation by frame, for each subgroup of employees we
observe. For each group, participation is greater under opt-out enrollment, consistent
with frame monotonicity.
Under A1-A4, Proposition 1.1 point-identifies the preferences of the consistent
decision-makers for enrollment. Substituting the estimated population moments into
the definition of Y C in Proposition 1 yields yC = 0.777, with a standard error of
0.006.23 Thus, under frame monotonicity, of the 63.2 percent of employees whose
enrollment decisions are insensitive to the enrollment default, 77.6 percent prefer
enrollment. Without frame monotonicity, Proposition 1.2 implies the fraction of
consistent employees that prefer enrollment is at least 77.6 percent. We therefore
conclude that a large majority of the consistent employees prefer to participate in the
plan.
4.3 Recovery of Population Preferences
Table 3 presents the conclusions about population preferences that can be drawn
from the data under assumptions of varying strength. With only A1-A3 (Column 1),
the answer is not much: Proposition 2 implies one can only rule out values of E[Y ∗i ]
below 0.350. The scope of this uncertainty is striking given that nearly 50 percent
of employees choose to participate even when enrollment is opt-in. Adding frame
monotonicity (Column 2) allows us to tighten these bounds significantly, yielding
0.491 ≤ E[Y ∗i ] ≤ 0.859. Thus, under A1-A4, an observer can conclude that at least a
(near) majority of employees prefer enrollment.
Determining how large of a majority prefers enrollment requires understanding
the relationship between employee preferences and consistency. As a benchmark,
consistency independence (Column 3) implies E[Y ∗i |Ci = 1] = E[Y ∗i |Ci = 0], so that
E[Y ∗i ] = 0.777. To shed light on the plausibility of this assumption in our data, Fig-
ure 1 plots estimates of E[Ci] and Y C for each demographic subgroup we observe. If
consistency independence was satisfied, we would expect the slope of this relationship
to be flat. Instead, the figure suggests a strongly positive relationship between prefer-
ences and consistency: groups with more consistent employees are also more likely to
contain more employees who prefer participation. The slope of the estimated best-fit
23Standard errors on yC and other finite-sample statistics were obtained using the delta method.
See Section B of the Online Appendix for details. Because the standard errors may converge slowly
to their asymptotic limits, the Online Appendix Table 2 reports bootstrap-derived standard errors,
which may yield better approximations in finite samples.
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Figure 1: Consistency versus Preference for Enrollment in a 401(k) Plan
Notes: Estimates based on calculations on data from Madrian and Shea (2001) provided to the authors. Each point on the scatter
plot consists of all workers with given values of compensation, age, sex, and race. The fraction consistent and fraction of consistent
decision-makers preferring enrollment are calculated using the take-up rates before and after automatic enrollment in each cell. The
size of the cell is proportional to the area of the circle.
line is 0.78. Characterizing this result as a formal test of unconditional consistency
independence requires assuming conditional consistency independence. Even so, for
(unconditional) consistency independence to hold given this finding, it would have to
be the case that conditional consistency independence fails, and the within-subgroup
correlation between preferences and consistency exactly offsets the observed between-
subgroup correlation. Because we see little reason to expect this correlation to be
positive between subgroups while negative within subgroups, we treat this possibility
as remote. Hence, we interpret Figure 1 as suggestive evidence against consistency
independence holding in our population. Motivated by Figure 1, an observer might
feel comfortable imposing that the relationship between consistency and preferences
is positive for the employees in our data, even without being confident about exactly
what the relationship is. Column 4 shows the implication of this assumption for
population preferences: 0.491 ≤ E[Y ∗i ] ≤ 0.777; roughly speaking, the assumption
suggests somewhere between one-half and three-quarters of employees prefer enroll-
ment. If the estimated slope in Figure 1 had instead been negative, the resulting
bounds would be even narrower: 0.777 ≤ E[Y ∗i ] ≤ 0.859.
We next consider conditional consistency independence. In our setting, this as-
sumption requires that among employees with the same income, age, gender, and
race, preferences for enrollment are uncorrelated with consistency. As discussed in
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Section 3.2, this assumption is most likely to hold when the remaining variation in
employees’ sensitivity to the default is mostly driven by factors exogenous to the
specific decision being considered. This can be satisfied in a types model of default
effects, or a bounded rationality model in which the characteristics we observe capture
most of the variation in preference intensity. In both cases, the remaining variation
in preferences must not correlated with unobserved variation in the “stickiness” of
the default.24
Column 5 of Table 3 presents the results of the matching analysis. We estimate
that the fraction of inconsistent employees preferring enrollment is 70.8 percent –
approximately 7 percentage points lower than the corresponding preferences for con-
sistent employees. The difference in estimated preferences between the consistent and
inconsistent employees is statistically significant (p < 0.001). For the full population
of employees, the analysis implies that 75.0 percent prefer enrollment.
Finally, recall that under a bounded rationality model of defaults, conditional
consistency independence tends to fail when most of the remaining variation in con-
sistency (after conditioning on observables) is driven by unobserved variation in the
utility “stakes” of the decision across decision-makers. Suppose that this is indeed the
case, and that decision-makers behave as described by the bounded rationality model
of defaults developed above. We allow the cost of active choice to vary by demo-
graphic group. Within each group, the distribution of utility gains from enrollment
are normally distributed. Thus γi = γX and F∆|X(∆ui) ∼ N(µX , σ2X) for all i such
that Xi = X, where Xi denotes i’s group. Note that this setup represents the ex-
treme case in which conditional consistency independence fails, since, by assumption,
all of the remaining variation in consistency is driven by the stakes of the decision,
|∆ui|.25 Within each group, observing the fraction of consistent decision-makers and
24For example, if cognitive ability was positively correlated with both consistency and preferences
among employees of the same age, gender, race, and income, our results would yield an upwardly-
biased estimate for the preferences of the inconsistent employees. The bias in the matching estimator
is given by E[Y ∗i ]− EX [Y C(Xi)] = EX
[




With the right data, one could attempt to recover population preferences by exploiting a decision
quality instrument. For example, one might randomly assign certain employees to a streamlined
process for actively choosing a plan or financial counseling services to help determine whether 401(k)
participation is consistent with the employee’s goals for saving and retirement.
25In the Online Appendix, we consider the case in which γ follows a log-normal distribution.
Appendix Figure 3 illustrates how different assumptions about the relative variance between γ and
∆u imply different conclusions about population preferences. When the variance of γ is relatively
small, estimated population preferences approaches the case in which γ is homogeneous, and all
25
Table 3: Estimates of Population Preferences















[77.6, 1] 77.6 77.6 77.6 77.6 77.6
(76.6, 1) (76.4, 78.9) (76.4, 78.9) (76.4, 78.9) (76.4, 78.9) (76.4, 78.9)
Fraction of inconsistent
preferring enrollment (%)
[0, 1] [0, 1] 77.6 [0, 77.6] 70.9 55.8
– – (76.4, 78.9) (0, 78.7) (68.5, 73.3) (55.1, 56.6)
Fraction of population
preferring enrollment (%)
[35.0, 1] [49.1, 85.9] 77.6 [49.1 , 77.6] 75.0 69.1
(33.9, 1) (47.8, 87.3) (76.4, 78.9) (47.8, 78.7) (73.4, 76.6) (68.1, 70.0)
Note: This table illustrates the estimation of enrollment preferences among consistent employees, inconsistent em-
ployees, and the population, under various sets of assumptions. Column 1 applies Propositions 1.2 and 2.2 under our
core assumptions excluding frame monotonicity. Column 2 adds the assumption of frame monotonicity and applies
Propositions 1.1 and 2.1. Column 3 adds the assumption of consistency independence. Column 4 assumes, based on
the group-level evidence in Figure 1, that the covariance between consistency and principles is positive. Column 5
assumes conditional consistency independence (Proposition 3) using the same set of employee characteristics as Figure
1. Column 6 reports results from the structural estimation of a bounded rationality model of default effects with all
variation in consistency due to variation in utility stakes. All estimates are based on data from Madrian and Shea
(2001) provided to the authors. We report 95% confidence intervals in parentheses under the estimates, using the
method of Imbens and Manski (2004) for partially identified parameters; see Section B of the Online Appendix for
details. Confidence intervals for Column (6) are calculated via a non-parametric bootstrap.
the preferences of that group allow us to identify µX/σX and γX/σX , which in turn,
allow us to recover the preferences of the inconsistent employees within the group.
Finally, aggregating the group-specific preferences using the prevalence of each group
in the population (or, using the weights in Lemma 1, the prevalence of each group
among the inconsistent decision-makers) allows us to recover population preferences
and preferences among the inconsistent employees.
The results of this analysis are reported in Column 6 of Table 3. Because assump-
tions A1-A4 are satisfied by this model of behavior, our estimate for the preferences
of the consistent employees is the same as in the other columns. In contrast, this
model suggests that just 56 percent of the inconsistent employees prefer enrollment.
Combining the consistent and inconsistent employees, we estimate the fraction of the
population preferring enrollment is approximately 69 percent. From this, we conclude
that a literal application of conditional consistency independence is not necessary for
obtaining the result that consistent employees prefer enrollment at a higher rate than
the variation in consistency is driven by ∆u. In contrast, when the variance of γ is relatively
large, variation in consistency is driven primarily by variation in that term. And because the model
assumes that γ and ∆ui are independently distributed, estimated population preferences in this case
approaches the estimates one obtains from assuming consistency independence. Consequently, one
can interpret Columns 3 and 6 as two extreme forms of a bounded rationality model in which the
distribution of structural parameters can vary by observable group membership.
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do inconsistent employees.
To better understand why we estimate a positive relationship between enrollment
preferences and consistency among the employees in our data, it is useful to investi-
gate how differences in preferences and consistency relate to employee characteristics.
Although we cannot directly observe either preferences or consistency for individ-
ual employees, the results in section 3.2 allow us to investigate differences based on
employees’ observable characteristics. We estimate a regression of the form
E[Yi |D, X] = α0 + α1D +X ′ β0 +X ′ β1D (3)
where Y and D are defined as above and X is a vector of employee characteristics.
Applying Proposition 1 (conditional on a given realization of X) implies that:
E[Ci |Xi = X] = 1− α1 −X
′
β1 (4)




1− α1 −X ′β1
(5)
The results of the analysis are reported in Table 4. We find that both consistency
and the preferences of consistent choosers vary systematically by employee charac-
teristics. Variation in consistency is strongly related to variation in compensation,
with those in the highest compensation bin (annual income over $50K), 40 percent
more likely to choose consistently than those in the lowest bin (annual income less
than $20K), and 41 percent more likely to prefer enrollment. After controlling for
income, preferences for enrollment, but not consistency, also vary by age, race, and
gender. These findings are consistent with the non-parametric evidence of a positive
relationship between consistency and consistent preferences in Figure 1.
Table 4 shows that preferences for 401(k) participation are lowest among young
and low-income employees (for example, in all four groups with employees below age
30 and salary below $20,000, we estimate that a majority prefers non-participation).
One explanation could be that younger and lower-income employees are more suscep-
tible to present-bias, so that the consistency principle (A3) is more strongly violated
for them than for other groups. The preferences revealed by consistent choices would
then still contain some bias, as in Example 3 of Section 1. Alternatively, it could be
that these employees expect their tenure at the firm to be too short for the employer
matching contribution to vest, in which case even a modest preference for liquidity
could lead to a preference for non-enrollment. Figure 2 investigates this hypothesis
27















30-39 years -0.033 0.008
(0.022) (0.017)







Notes: Estimates are based on equations (3)-(5), using disaggregated data from Madrian and Shea (2001) provided
to the authors. The left-out groups for each demographic characteristic are 1) employees with compensation less
than $20K, 2) employees with age less than 30 years, 3) non-white employees, and 4) female employees. Column (1)
examines the conditional probability that an employee is consistent . Column (2) examines the conditional
probability that a consistent chooser prefers enrollment, holding other characteristics constant. Standard errors
calculated using the delta method are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
by plotting preferences for enrollment by demographic group against the fraction of
the group remaining at the firm two years from the date of hire – the time at which
the 50 percent employer matching contribution vests. The observed relationship is
strong and positive. In addition, the best-fit line for the group-level regression has
an R2 of over 90%, suggesting that our estimated preferences are a strong predic-
tor of ultimate tenure at the firm for most groups. This evidence is reassuring, as
it is consistent with the hypothesis that the preference information recovered by our
analysis is driven by rational differences in employee expectations, rather than simply
reflecting unobserved biases.
4.4 Discussion
The above results illustrate how researchers can use our proposed framework to re-
cover more credible estimates of preference information than what would otherwise
be available. Using the type of data that is already routinely collected, we show
how the preference information that can be learned depends on the strength of the
assumptions an observer is willing to impose. A central virtue of this approach is
its transparency – researchers who rely from the start of their analysis on a specific
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Figure 2: Retention Rates and Preferences for Enrollment
Notes: Estimates are based on calculations on data from Madrian and Shea (2001) provided to the authors. We plot the retention rate
at 24 months against the fraction preferring enrollment, for each observable group. Each point on the bubble scatter plot consists of
all workers with given values of compensation, age and sex. The size of the cell is proportional to the area of the circle. Our
interpretation of the figure assumes conditional consistency independence; without this assumption the x-axis can be interpreted as
the fraction of consistent choosers preferring enrollment. Due to additional sample size restrictions necessary to study retention rates,
we do not include race as a covariate. Earlier matching results are similar without using race as a covariate. Data on retention is
calculated using captures of the relevant data at specific dates roughly 6 months apart. An employee is counted as retained in a
month if he or she is still at the firm as of the most recent date of observation. Results are similar using retention at 12 or 18 months.
behavioral model often implicitly impose A1-A4 in addition to some relationship be-
tween preferences and consistency. Thus, even if one ends up relying on a specific
behavioral model, our approach highlights how the assumptions of the model con-
tribute to identification – i.e., how they narrow the identification region relative to
weaker assumptions, such as A1-A4 alone.
In the specific application we study, our results show that under relatively weak
assumptions (A1-A4), the vast majority (78%) of consistent employees at the firm
we study prefer 401(k) enrollment, as do between 49 and 86 percent of all employ-
ees. Adding an additional assumption about the direction of the relationship between
preferences and consistency based on the non-parametric evidence in Figure 1 allows
one to narrow these bounds to conclude that the fraction of all employees preferring
enrollment is somewhere between 49% and 78%. Imposing a stronger, but still plau-
sible, assumption in the form of conditional consistency independence allows one to
point-estimate the fraction of employees preferring enrollment at 74%. Alternatively,
one can pin down the relationship between preferences and consistency by imposing
a specific behavioral model; the one we consider yields a lower estimate of popula-
tion preferences (69%), but agrees with our matching estimator that the inconsistent
employees tend to prefer enrollment at a lower rate than the consistent employees.
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5 Cardinal Welfare Metrics and Price Variation
Thus far we have focused exclusively on the identification of ordinal preferences, the
object directly identified by conventional revealed preference analysis. In this section,
we consider how the preference information recovered by our approach relates to
standard money-metric welfare measures. As is the case without framing effects,
constructing these welfare measures requires observing variation in the relative price
of the available options.
Let p ∈ R denote the price of option 1 relative to option 0. We assume the fraction
of individuals choosing option 1 is observed (or can be estimated) at any price p and
under each frame D ∈ {0, 1}, and denote it Y (p,D) = E[Yi(p,D)].
Holding price fixed, this model is isomorphic to the main model considered above.
Our identifying assumptions have simple analogs here, supposing that they hold at
any fixed price. In that case, the results we describe can be used to identify E[Y ∗i (p)],
for any fixed p.26 One can then trace out this measure of frame-free demand for
option 1 – that is, demand once framing effects have been eliminated and individuals
choose according to Y ∗i (p) – at each p to obtain the frame-free demand curve, Y
∗(p).
Denote the inverse of this demand curve by p∗(Y ).
For simplicity, assume that decision-makers have quasi-linear preferences, Ui(Yi, xi) =
u(Yi) + xi for some numeraire xi, and budget constraint pYi + xi = zi. Given quasi-
linearity, we can express the money-metric difference in utility between the two op-
tions as Ui(1)− Ui(0) = p∗i − p, where p∗i denotes the reservation price for individual
i, p∗i ≡ ui(1)− ui(0). Social welfare is W (p, D) =
´
i
Ui (Yi(p, D), p).
Knowledge of Y ∗(p) alone is sufficient to answer a number of questions of interest.
Intuitively, the function substitutes for the standard demand curve used to estimate
equivalent or compensating variation. For example, one could evaluate the welfare
effect of assigning each individual with option 1 versus assigning each individual with
option 0 by integrating p∗(Y ) over the population. As another example, one could
use Y ∗(p) to calculate the welfare effect on consumers of a price change that occurs
under a “refinement” frame (D∗) in which all individuals choose according to Y ∗i (p).
Conducting welfare comparisons when some choices are made under D = 0 or
D = 1 requires additional structure because these comparisons depend on the joint
distribution of Yi(0, p), Yi(1, p), and Y ∗i (p). We sketch one strategy for dealing with
26We set aside the assumption of exactly which approach is used to identify Y ∗(p) .
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this issue here:
(A8) For each individual i and frame D, there exists a unique reservation price,
pi(D), such that p < pi(D) ⇐⇒ Yi(p, D) = 1
(A9) There exists a common index i such that Yi(p, 0) > Yi′(p, 0) ⇐⇒ Yi(p, 1) >
Yi′(p, 1) ⇐⇒ Y ∗i (p) > Y ∗i′ (p) for any i, i′.
For example, these two assumptions would be satisfied under a model in which
decision-makers are consistent whenever the intensity of their preference exceeds
some threshold. Given this additional structure, we are guaranteed to have three
well-defined inverse demand curves: p(Y , 1), p(Y , 0), and p∗(Y ), corresponding (re-
spectively) to Y (p, 1), Y (p, 0), and Y ∗(p). Note that frame monotonicity implies
p(Y , 1) ≤ p∗(Y ) ≤ p(Y , 0) for any Y .
Assumptions (A8) and (A9) allow us to perform welfare comparisons for most
policy changes one might be interested in. These comparisons are possible because,
given the common index structure (A9), we know that at a given value of Y , the
values of the inverse demand curves p(Y , 1), p(Y , 0), and p∗(Y ) correspond to the
three individual reservation prices pi(1), pi(0), and p∗i for the same individual. Thus,
recovering the three aggregate demand curves also allows us to recover the joint dis-
tribution of individual demand curves that is essential to the welfare calculation. The
following proposition describes two such welfare comparisons.
Proposition 5 Suppose that (A1)-(A4) hold at any price; (A8) and (A9) imply
(5.1) The welfare impact of an increase in price from p0 to p1 under the frame D = 0




(5.2) The welfare impact of changing the frame from D = 0 to D = 1 is W (p, 1)−
W (p, 0) =
´ Y (p,1)
Y (p,0) [p
∗(Y )− p]dY .
Figure (3) illustrates these welfare calculations. Figure (3a) illustrates (5.1), the
welfare effect of increasing the price under D = 0. The price change reduces welfare
by inducing some of those who were consuming option 1 to switch to option 0, and
also by raising the price for those who continue to consume option 1. The welfare
calculation for a price change under D = 1 is analogous.
Figure 3b illustrates (5.2), the welfare effect of changing the frame from D = 0 to
D = 1, at some fixed price p. The welfare effect of changing the frame falls entirely
on inconsistent choosers in this model because these are the individuals who change
their behavior when the frame changes.27 The inconsistent choosers who prefer option
27 One could incorporate a cost of choosing against the frame into individual welfare, in which
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Figure 3: Illustration of Welfare Calculations
(a) Change in Price in Frame D = 0 (b) Change frame from D = 0 to D = 1
Note:
This figure illustrates the welfare effects of a change in the price under a frame D = 0 (Sub-Figure a) and a change
in frame from D = 0 to D = 1 at fixed price p (Sub-Figure b). Decreases in welfare are represented as red-shaded
regions; increases are represented as grey-shaded regions.
0 at price p are made worse off by a switch to D = 1 (the red shaded region in the
graph) and the inconsistent choosers who prefer option 1 are made better off (the
black shaded region). The amount by which a given individual is better or worse off
is determined by p∗i − p. By integrating the estimated demand functions, one can
therefore determine whether welfare is higher under D = 0 or D = 1. The figure is
drawn for the case in which D = 0 leads to higher welfare at the specified price.
6 Conclusion
Recovering preferences when framing effects are present is a fundamental challenge in
behavioral economics. Our proposed approach is to maintain the revealed preference
assumption unless an apparent framing effect is observed. In that case, we relax the
revealed preference assumption as much as is required to accommodate the observed
framing effect, but no further. We show that this transforms the original preference
recovery problem into one of accounting for potentially endogenous selection into the
sub-population of consistent decision-makers. Applying this approach can lead to
novel insights even in well-studied settings like automatic enrollment into pension
case the consistent individuals would also matter for evaluating the change in welfare (see Goldin
and Reck, 2018).
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plans, as illustrated in the empirical application.
More generally, our approach offers two main advantages to empirical researchers
when framing effects are present. First, it offers simple and practical tools to recover
preference information without having to commit to a specific behavioral model or set
of functional form assumptions. In the many settings in which our core assumptions
are plausible, Propositions 1 and 2 allow the researcher to estimate the preferences
of consistent decision-makers and to bound the preferences of the population. Point-
identifying population preferences raises additional challenges, and, depending on the
application, the empirical tools we developed might offer a path forward. But even
when our tools are unlikely to apply, understanding the preference recovery challenge
as a selection problem may still provide insight. For example, a researcher’s knowl-
edge of an application may suggest that preferences and consistency are positively
correlated, which, in conjunction with Equation (2), would narrow the range of values
in which population preferences might fall.
The second benefit to our framework is that it makes model-based approaches to
preference identification more transparent. As long as the model satisfies our core
assumptions, our results shed light on which features of the model are driving the
identification, namely the behavioral and distributional assumptions that pin down
the relationship between preferences and consistency. Highlighting these features can
help researchers choose between models and assess the credibility of their results.
At the same time, our approach is subject to at least two important limitations.
First, the reduced form nature of our proposed tools might lure researchers into using
them in settings in which their identifying assumptions are not met. We have tried
to alleviate this concern by highlighting the types of conditions in which each tool is
valid in the context of specific behavioral models.
Second, we have assumed throughout that the presence of the framing effect is the
only reason that decision-makers’ choices fail to reflect their preferences. When other
biases cause choices to diverge from preferences, choices will not reveal preferences
even once the framing effect has been removed. In such cases, applying our approach
still yields the (counterfactual) choices decision-makers would make if the framing
effect had not been present, but the preferences inferred from those (counter-factual)
choices must be further adjusted before preferences can be recovered. For example,
one might combine our approach with the analysis of decisions made by experts, or
some other reference group (see Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018), to test whether the
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expert choices resemble the non-expert choices once the influence of framing effects
has been removed. If not, it might suggest that biases other than framing effects are
playing a role.
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